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I. INTRODUCTION 
In promulgating the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: 
Analysis and Recommendations (hereinafter “Family Dissolution 
Principles” or “Principles”),1 the American Law Institute (ALI) 
proposes an extensive set of new rules to apply in proceedings 
relating to family dissolution. Among the subjects covered by the 
ALI Principles are child custody (chapter 2), child support (chapter 
3), property division (chapter 4), alimony (chapter 5), domestic 
partnership (chapter 6), and antenuptial and pre-cohabitation 
agreements (chapter 7). As the first proposal of any national legal 
institution for general reforms of family dissolution law since the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (“UMDA”), which was 
proposed more than thirty years ago,2 the Family Dissolution 
Principles are both very timely and significant. The ALI is a 
prestigious law reform organization that has sponsored many 
successful law reform proposals during the past seventy-eight years.3 
The Principles are the product of eleven years of labor by respected 
law professor Reporters,4 who were advised by three dozen very 
 
 1. All references to provisions of chapters 6 and 7 and the comments and the 
Reporter’s Notes thereto are to the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)]. 
 2. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 1 (1998). The 
UMDA, as it is known, was first approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1970 and was amended in 1971 and 1973. While it has been a law 
teacher’s favorite, it has been less popular with state legislatures and was only adopted by eight 
states (with some deviations from the UMDA in most of them); all eight states acted to adopt 
the UMDA between 1972 and 1977. Id. (Table of Jurisdictions). 
 3. The ALI was founded in 1923 and has included many of America’s most influential 
judges, lawyers, and law professors among its members since its founding. The ALI has 
promulgated many highly influential “Restatements of the Law” in various fields of law 
(including Agency, Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Torts, and Trusts, to name but a few), helped 
in the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, and drafted several influential model codes, 
including the Model Penal Code and the Model Code of Evidence. See The American Law 
Institute, at http://ali.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2001). 
 4. The Chief Reporter was Ira Ellman, law professor at Arizona State University, lead 
author of a highly regarded family law casebook, and a prolific family law scholar. He was 
assisted by Katharine T. Bartlett, co-author of the same casebook, respected author of 
significant articles about custody and children, as well as the Dean of Duke University School 
of Law. Grace Ganz Blumberg of UCLA Law School and a respected authority on financial 
issues relating to marital dissolution was the third Reporter. Marygold S. Melli, a highly 
respected family law professor and prolific family law scholar from the University of Wisconsin 
also served for a time as a Reporter and was later a consultant. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 
No. 4), supra note 1, at v. 
13WARD.DOC 12/5/01  5:08 AM 
1189] Deconstructing Family 
 1193 
influential members of the legal profession, including a dozen highly 
respected state court judges,5 and attended by several dozen other 
knowledgeable and important lawyers, law professors, and judges.6 
Thus, the Family Dissolution Principles has an impeccable pedigree, 
and because many influential jurists, law professors, and bar leaders 
helped to create it, it is certain to find a receptive audience in at least 
some lawmaking, legal, and academic circles. Clearly, the ALI Family 
Dissolution Principles must be taken very seriously as a significant law 
reform proposal that could have a major impact upon family law in 
America. 
A. The ALI Proposal to Expand the Categories of Relationships 
Accorded “Family” Legal Status and Benefits 
While some of the principles incorporated in the Family 
Dissolution Principles are quite familiar to practitioners and scholars 
of family law, many of the proposals go far beyond existing law and 
recommend radical changes in family laws and policies. Perhaps the 
most revolutionary proposals would expand the types of relationships 
that receive privileged “family” status and benefits. Most of the 
chapters of the Family Dissolution Principles contain provisions that 
deconstruct, level, or redefine “family” relationships. For example, 
many of the sections of chapter 2 (custody), chapter 5 
(compensatory payments), chapter 6 (domestic partners), and 
chapter 7 (agreements) contain provisions that either significantly 
redefine currently protected family relations or radically alter existing 
family law doctrines. Among the most disturbing of the proposed 
leveling reforms are those in chapter 6 (domestic partners), where 
the ALI proposes to significantly expand the types of relationships 
that may claim the full economic protections and privileges of marital 
status upon dissolution. 
This article focuses on chapter 6 to demonstrate the family-
deconstruction-and-relational-equalization theme of the ALI Family 
Dissolution Principles and to show that the ALI Principles radically 
redefine family by substantially expanding the categories of persons 
 
 5. Among the distinguished jurists who served as special advisers were Chief Justice 
Shirley S. Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Justice Joseph P. Warner of the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court, and Judge Judith Mitchell Billings of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Id. at v–vi. 
 6. See id. at v–xii. 
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and relationships that are given legal preference as “family” 
relationships. Chapter 6 is predicated upon some erroneous 
assumptions about the characteristics of same-sex and heterosexual 
nonmarital cohabitation (as well as the nature and qualities of 
marriage in general) and about the sameness of the economic 
expectations and interdependence of nonmarital cohabitants and 
marital couples. By broadly defining domestic partners, liberally 
providing for how that status may be established, and proposing to 
extend identical (full marital) economic benefits to domestic partners 
upon dissolution, the ALI moves toward equalizing the legal status 
of all adult domestic relationships and the economic consequences of 
their dissolution. 
Part I.B of this article provides a summary and overview of 
chapter 6 (domestic partners) of the Family Dissolution Principles. 
Part II notes some “good intentions” and laudable objectives of 
chapter 6, such as protecting couples who have lived in actual 
marriage-like relationships without the formal status of marriage and 
removing the economic incentive (for men, at least) to enter into 
nonmarital cohabitation relationships instead of marriages. Part III 
reveals how those good intentions have gone awry in the details of 
the particular provisions of chapter 6 and suggests how those 
provisions may seriously weaken and undermine the institution of 
marriage. Part IV shows that the major flaws of chapter 6 are not 
merely inadvertent or accidental; the ideological bias against 
marriage and marriage-based family relations is reflected in many 
chapters of the Family Dissolution Principles. Chapter 2 (custody), 
chapter 5 (compensatory payments), and chapter 7 (agreements) also 
contain provisions that significantly deconstruct and redefine family 
relations. Those chapters manifest significant hostility against the 
traditional family and against relationships established by kinship, 
marriage, and marital adoption. This article concludes by lamenting 
that the radicalism of the ALI Family Dissolution Principles 
represents a lost opportunity for an influential organization to 
provide responsible leadership by proposing reasonable, well-drafted 
reforms in the area of family dissolution law. 
B. An Overview of Chapter 6 
Chapter 6, entitled “Domestic Partners,” is one of the shorter 
chapters of the ALI Family Dissolution Principles, containing only six 
black letter sections and just sixty pages of text, commentary, and 
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notes. It was not part of the original ALI project on the Principles of 
the Law of Family Dissolution and was added as the project drew to 
completion.7 It defines “domestic partnership” as a new legal family 
status, provides rules for how the new relationship is established, and 
defines the legal benefits and obligations that result from the 
establishment and dissolution of that new relationship. 
Section 6.01 defines the scope of the chapter, which is to govern 
the financial claims of any two unmarried persons “who for a 
significant period of time share a primary residence and a life 
together as a couple.”8 Chapter 6 applies only to financial claims 
arising at the termination of the relationship,9 is subject to proper 
written opt-out contracts,10 and may not be applied to “compromise 
the marital claims” of the lawful spouse of a domestic partner.11 
Section 6.02 defines the twin objectives of chapter 6: to provide 
for “fair distribution of the economic gains and losses incident to 
termination” of a domestic partnership relationship, and to protect 
society “from social welfare burdens that should be borne” by 
former domestic partners.12 This is to be achieved by allocating 
property owned by either domestic partner in light of, inter alia, 
“equitable claims . . . [arising] in consequence of the relationship,”13 
and allocating financial losses (including via alimony) “according to 
equitable principles.”14 
Section 6.03 defines who are to be deemed “domestic partners” 
and how that new legal status is to be established. There are three 
levels of inclusion—three ways to establish domestic partnership. 
Two involve legal presumptions: one irrebuttable and one 
rebuttable. “In general, domestic partners are two persons of the 
same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a 
 
 7. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS, Introduction, at xiv (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, Feb. 14, 1997) 
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, Part I)]; id. at 11–14. 
 8. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01(1). 
 9. Id. Claims arising during the relationship and afterward for child support (and, of 
course, for custody and visitation) are not covered by chapter 6. Id. § 6.01(4). 
 10. Id. § 6.01(3). The general requirement that the agreement be in writing is 
contained in section 7.05(1). However, section 6.01(3) allows enforcement of contracts that 
are otherwise “enforceable under applicable law.” Id. 
 11. Id. § 6.01(5). 
 12. Id. § 6.02(1), (2). 
 13. Id. § 6.02(1)(a). 
 14. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02(1)(b). 
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significant period of time share a primary residence and a life 
together . . . .”15 Couples are irrebutably presumed to be domestic 
partners (“[p]ersons are domestic partners”) “when they have 
maintained a common household . . . with their common child” for 
a minimum continuous (but unspecified) period of time called the 
“cohabitation parenting period.”16 Couples are rebuttably presumed 
to be domestic partners if they are not related by blood or adoption 
and have maintained a common household for a minimum 
continuous (but unspecified) period of time called the “cohabitation 
period.”17 If neither presumption applies, a party may still establish 
domestic partnership by proving “that for a significant period of time 
the parties shared a primary residence and a life together as a 
couple.”18 This determination must be made in light of thirteen 
categorical considerations described in the section, including oral 
statements, commingled finances, economic dependency, specialized 
roles, changes in the parties’ lives, naming beneficiaries, distinctive 
relations, emotional and sexual intimacy, community reputation, 
commitment or attempted marriage ceremony, joint procreation, 
childrearing or adoption, and common household.19 The fact that 
one or both of the parties is (or are) married to another (or others), 
or that the parties could not otherwise legally be married to each 
other (for example, consanguinity or incest laws would prohibit their 
marriage or sexual union) is no bar to finding that he, she, or they 
are also domestic partners.20 
Section 6.04 defines domestic partnership property as property 
that would have been marital property had the parties been married 
to each other “during the domestic-partnership period.”21 However, 
 
 15. Id. § 6.03(1); see also id. § 6.01(1) (“Domestic partners are two persons of the same 
or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time share a 
primary residence and a life together as a couple, as determined by § 6.03.”). 
 16. Id. § 6.03(2) (first emphasis added). The amount of time in the cohabitation 
parenting period is undetermined in the Principles but is to be set in a “uniform rule of 
statewide application.” Id. However, in the comments, a two-year period is used to illustrate 
the point. Id. cmt. d; see also illus. 3, 7–8. 
 17. Id. § 6.03(3). The amount of time in the cohabitation period is undetermined in the 
Principles but is to be set in a “uniform rule of statewide application.” Id. However, in the 
comments, a period of three years is used to illustrate the point. See id. cmt. d & illus. 4–6. 
 18. Id. § 6.03(6). 
 19. Id. § 6.03(7)(a)–(m). 
 20. Id. § 6.03(7)(k) & cmt. d; id. § 6.01(5) & cmts. c–d. 
 21. Id. § 6.04(1). This period begins when the parties conceive a child or begin sharing 
a primary residence and lasts until they cease sharing a primary residence. Id. § 6.04(2). 
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recharacterizing separate property as domestic-partnership property 
is not allowed.22 
Section 6.05 provides that “[d]omestic-partnership property 
should be divided according to the principles set forth for the 
division of marital property . . . .”23 In other words, domestic 
partners enjoy exactly the same property division claims and rights as 
married couples. 
Likewise, section 6.06 provides that “a domestic partner is 
entitled to compensatory payments [alimony] on the same basis as a 
spouse.”24 Again, with one minor exception, the economic benefit 
provided to domestic partners is identical to that given to married 
couples.25 
Overall, chapter 6 provides that persons who live together for a 
minimum period, or at least one of whom has experienced some 
change of life “fostered” or “wrought” by their cohabitation, and 
those who have expressly so contracted, comprise a domestic 
partnership. As such, they are entitled to the same economic benefits 
and incur the same economic obligations upon dissolution as 
attributed by law to married couples. 
II. THE “GOOD INTENTIONS” OF CHAPTER 6 
Since chapter 6 is an example of some apparently good intentions 
gone awry, it is appropriate to begin by noting the apparently good 
intentions or objectives. Five laudable goals or restrictions are 
particularly noteworthy. 
First, one goal of chapter 6 is to provide financial protection for 
economically dependent or loss-suffering parties to long-lasting 
nonmarital cohabitation relationships that are truly marriage-like in 
quality and characteristics who made no express agreement about 
financial consequences.26 The abundant case law regarding common 
law marriages, putative spouses, and some equitable remedies reveals 
that some parties enter into marriage-like relationships with 
 
 22. Id. § 6.04(3). 
 23. Id. § 6.05. 
 24. Id. § 6.06(1)(a). 
 25. The only (minor) exception is that care of a child for whom the partner is not a legal 
parent or parent by estoppel cannot provide the sole basis of a claim for compensatory 
payment. Id. § 6.06(2). 
 26. See generally PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01; id. § 6.02 
cmt. a. 
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reasonable expectations that they really are (or are the same as) 
marriages, including expectation of financial protections associated 
with marriages.27 Chapter 6 would provide significant economic 
protection for parties who have developed real, long-term, marriage-
like relationships, but who have never been properly married. The 
goal of protecting the financial interests or financial equity of 
individuals who enter into such relationships is similar to the policy 
underlying common law marriage, putative spouse, and equitable 
doctrines (like unjust enrichment) and certainly is laudable. 
Second, the drafters of chapter 6 clearly intend to give parties an 
incentive to marry by removing the economic opportunity to get 
“free milk” without marriage.28 By removing an opportunity to 
circumvent financial responsibility for a partner in a marriage-like 
relationship, chapter 6 can be seen as pro-marriage.29  
Third, chapter 6 rejects the formal registration of domestic 
partnerships. It thus differs from the approach taken by the Vermont 
Legislature, which enacted a “Civil Union” registration scheme30 
pursuant to the Vermont Supreme Court mandate that the 
legislature extend equally the legal protections of marriage to same-
sex couples.31 By contrast, domestic partnership under chapter 6 is 
merely a retrospective status, operative only after the relationship has 
ended.32 Since no formalization is required or expected at the outset, 
domestic partnership under chapter 6 does not resemble the creation 
of marriage. That avoids one potentially objectionable concern about 
 
 27. See, e.g., Renshaw v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (awarding social security 
benefits to woman as common law spouse of man with whom she lived in New York for 
twenty-one years as his wife); Spearman v. Spearman, 482 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(addressing situation of ceremonial marriage in good faith belief of validity by wife followed by 
seven years living as husband and wife); Albina Engine & Mach. Works v. O’Leary, 328 F.2d 
877 (9th Cir. 1964) (discussing experience of cohabitation for twenty-three years, including 
eighteen after prior marriage dissolved, and three children); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 
1204 (Ill. 1979) (dealing with couple who lived as man and wife for fifteen years and had three 
children). 
 28. A Scandinavian neighbor told my wife and me of a close friend of hers who was 
cohabiting in her homeland with her boyfriend. She warned her friend several times that she 
was putting her boyfriend in the situation of asking himself, “Why pay for a cow when I am 
getting free milk?” After years of cohabitation, our neighbor’s friend was “dumped” by her 
boyfriend, who decided to marry a younger woman. 
 29. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. b. 
 30. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2001). 
 31. Baker v. Virginia, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 32. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03. 
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confusing or equating domestic partnership formation with marriage 
formation.  
Fourth, chapter 6 extends only limited benefits to domestic 
partners. The benefits are limited in two ways. First, only parties to 
the domestic partnership incur economic benefits or burdens from 
the relationship. Chapter 6 does not extend rights or obligations to 
or from third persons or the state.33 Likewise, the benefits available 
under chapter 6 are only available upon termination of the 
relationship during the lifetime of the parties.34 They do not apply 
during the relationship, nor does chapter 6 deal with inheritance or 
succession. Limiting the scope of benefits that flow from the status 
of domestic partnership is prudent and appealing.35  
Fifth, chapter 6 also provides that domestic partner claims 
against a married domestic partner cannot be recognized if they 
“compromise the marital claims of a domestic partner’s spouse.”36 
The Reporters emphasize that the married spouse of the domestic 
partner takes priority over the unmarried domestic partner.37 
For these goals and provisions, the ALI deserves credit for its 
good intentions. However, the good intentions that underlie chapter 
6 of the ALI Family Dissolution Principles have gone awry. They are 
offset and overwhelmed by flawed, sometimes radical provisions; 
these are discussed in the next section. 
III. GOOD INTENTIONS GONE AWRY: THE DECONSTRUCTION AND 
REDEFINITION OF MARITAL STATUS 
The problems with chapter 6 of the Family Dissolution Principles 
are twofold. First, chapter 6 goes far beyond the intentions and goals 
noted above. Those good intentions are rendered meaningless by 
some of the radical provisions that broadly define domestic 
partnership, set low standards for domestic partner determinations, 
and equate nonmarital cohabitation with marriage. The remedies 
 
 33. Id. § 6.01 cmt. a. 
 34. Id. §§ 6.01(1), 6.02(1). 
 35. However, the absence of any principled explanation justifying these limitations is 
troubling. See infra Part III.F.1. 
 36. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01(5). 
 37. Id. § 6.01 cmt. c. Thus, both the spouse and a subsequent domestic partner may 
recover financial claims against a married man who has both a wife and a partner. “The result 
may be that the person involved in both relationships ends up with little or no property.” Id. at 
7. 
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provided are stunningly excessive and inappropriate, simply imported 
wholesale from marriage law rather than tailored to the 
characteristics of domestic partnerships. Second, a number of 
problems arise relating to how chapter 6 would accomplish the 
“good intentions” and objectives noted in Part II. Many provisions 
are overbroad, loose, and ambiguous. Key sections of chapter 6 are 
poorly drafted, evading critical policy issues and inviting judicial 
legislation to fill in the large interstices in the vague provisions. 
Moreover, chapter 6 ignores and fails to build upon, reasonably 
develop, and expand existing legal doctrines. 
The most significant flaws of chapter 6 of the ALI Family 
Dissolution Principles can be grouped into eight categories. They are 
described below. 
A. The Provisions Defining “Domestic Partners” Are Overbroad 
The definition of “domestic partners” is extremely broad and 
overinclusive, exceeding the reasonable expectations of marriage or 
marriage-like economic interdependence. Its breadth will invite 
litigation and encourage the assertion of domestic partnership claims 
in cases when there is no just basis for them. Two unmarried people 
are deemed to be domestic partners and subject to the provisions of 
chapter 6 if “for a significant period of time [they] share a primary 
residence and a life together as a couple.”38 The requirement that 
they cohabit for “a significant time” and that they have lived “as a 
couple” are so subjective as to invite judges to simply resort to 
personal preferences in deciding the issue. 
The definition of domestic partners in chapter 6 is so broad that 
it could include persons who did not intend to intermingle their 
economic lives or incur any financial support or property sharing 
obligations. Arguably, it could even include persons who actually 
and demonstrably intend not to intermingle their economic lives or 
incur any financial support or property sharing obligations. Any two 
people unmarried to each other who live together as a couple in a 
primary residence for a significant time and who do not explicitly and 
 
 38. Id. § 6.03 (1); see also id. § 6.01(1). During the discussions at the May 2000 plenary 
meeting of the ALI, at which chapter 6 was approved, there was some suggestion that 
language be added to limit this definition to those who were eligible to have the relationship 
recognized as a marriage. In general, suggestions of that nature were rejected by the Reporters, 
but it remains to be seen how the final definition will be crafted. 
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properly agree not to be domestic partners may nevertheless be 
found to be domestic partners.39 
Persons involved in relationships that are against public policy, 
including those that are prohibited by criminal law, would still 
apparently qualify for financial benefits as domestic partners if the 
parties are not married and live together as a couple for the requisite 
period of time. Presumably, this would include relationships of 
incest, concubinage, adultery, polygamy,40 and arguably even sexual 
relationships involving parties who are not old enough to get 
married. Even if one of the parties is married to someone else, that 
person may be both a spouse and a domestic partner with an 
adulterous paramour, concubine, mistress, or with multiple lovers at 
the same time. The Reporters specifically provide that claims may be 
asserted even if “one or both of the domestic partners were married 
to someone else” unless that would “compromise the marital claims” 
of the legal spouse.41 Incestuous relations are explicitly included.42 
Chapter 6 specifically extends domestic partnership status and 
benefits to same-sex couples.43 Thus, in the name of economic 
morality, chapter 6 deliberately ignores many other moral concerns. 
In chapter 6, the only morality that matters is economic. 
B. Domestic Partnership Is Too Easy to Establish Under Chapter 6 
The broad definition of “domestic partners” in chapter 6 might 
be relatively harmless if it were offset by carefully drafted standards 
governing how domestic partnership is to be proven in court. 
Regrettably, however, chapter 6 is designed to make it extremely 
easy to establish “domestic partnership.” 
 
 39. Id. § 6.03(1) & cmt. b. 
 40. In the discussions at the ALI May 2000 annual meeting, one Reporter suggested 
that polygamy was not intended to be included. But it was not textually excluded at that time. 
 41. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01(5). 
 42. The drafters of chapter 6 considered and explicitly rejected the exclusion from 
benefits of domestic partnership couples whose relationship would be incestuous and illegal, 
even criminal. Thus, even the phrase “[p]ersons not related by blood or adoption” appears in 
section 6.03(3). To narrow the class of persons who may benefit from a particular 
presumption, the Reporters emphasize: “Its inclusion in Paragraph (3) is not intended to 
exclude partners related by blood or adoption from the coverage of this Chapter.” Id. § 6.03 
cmt. d, at 22. 
 43. Id. §§ 6.01(1), 6.03(1). 
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1. Domestic partnership is too easy to establish by presumption 
Section 6.03 establishes strong presumptions that make it 
extremely easy to obtain the benefits of domestic partnership 
provided by chapter 6. The presumptions will be dispositive in most 
cases. If the couple are not related by blood or adoption, they “are 
presumed to be domestic partners when they have maintained a 
common household . . . for a continuous [amount of time] . . . 
called the cohabitation period.”44 Regardless of their relationship 
(even including persons related by blood or adoption), if two people 
have maintained a common household with a common child for a set 
period of time, the presumption that they are domestic partners is 
irrebuttable.45 
The two presumptions of section 6.03 are drafted very broadly 
and are intended to apply in most cases. The Reporters note that 
“detailed inquiry into the lives of couples to determine whether they 
are domestic partners . . . will normally not be necessary, because 
most cases will be decided under one of the two rules 
[presumptions] set forth in Paragraphs (2) and (3).”46 Thus, chapter 
6 is extremely pro-domestic partnership. In an apparent effort not to 
exclude any possible just claimant, chapter 6 goes overboard in 
including as domestic partners many who would have no just claim 
or reasonable expectations of an economic partnership akin to 
marriage. 
2. Chapter 6 makes it too easy to establish domestic partnership even 
without the benefit of the presumptions 
In contrast to other chapters of the Family Dissolution 
Principles,47 chapter 6 actually expands dramatically the discretion of 
the court to find domestic partnership and encourages judges to 
exercise that broad discretion in favor of finding couples to be 
domestic partners. If a person claiming to be a domestic partner does 
not qualify for the benefit of either the rebuttable or irrebuttable 
 
 44. Id. § 6.03(3). 
 45. Id. § 6.03(2). 
 46. Id. § 6.03 cmt. d. 
 47. That stands in stark contrast to the anti-discretion principle that generally 
characterizes the Family Dissolution Principles. J. Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field 
Theory of the Family: The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 
2001 BYU L. REV. 923. 
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presumption, the party claiming to have been a domestic partner has 
only the ordinary civil case burden “of proving that for a significant 
period of time the parties shared a primary residence and a life 
together as a couple.”48 In reaching a decision, the court must 
consider a laundry list of thirteen factors to determine whether the 
couple “shared life together as a couple” and thus qualify as 
domestic partners.49 To give judges discretion to find in favor of 
domestic partnership limited only by a sweeping list of thirteen 
factors is to give them virtually unbridled discretion and a biased 
(pro-partnership) disposition. 
Section 6.03(7), listing the thirteen specific factors and 
circumstances that the courts should consider in determining 
whether or not a relationship qualifies for domestic partner status, 
calls for extensive, close, factual scrutiny to make a determination. 
This contradicts the Reporters’ assertion that they have crafted 
section 6 to avoid individualized inquiries.50 The discretion to find 
domestic partnership on the basis of thirteen factors—even when 
there is no presumption because of inadequate time of cohabitation 
or lack of a common child—seems to be tilted to encourage the 
court to find domestic partnership. 
The overall approach of section 6.03 is to “ascertain whether the 
parties conducted themselves as spouses normally do in the course of 
family life.”51 The standard may sound benign, but the 
implementation is not. Despite the Reporters’ comments that 
persons who are merely sharing a dwelling and not sharing their lives 
are not covered,52 the distinction is extremely elusive. For example, 
college roommates ordinarily do not intend to enter into marriage-
like “domestic partner” relationships with each other, but that may 
not be so apparent to a trier of fact. College roommates often spend 
a lot of time with each other and support each other emotionally 
(when report cards reveal disappointing grades, when job interviews 
do not lead to summer employment offers, when family members 
die, etc.). They often commingle expenses such as utility and phone 
bills, they frequently share food, and may even cook and eat 
 
 48. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(6). 
 49. Id. § 6.03(7). 
 50. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b. 
 51. Id. § 6.03 cmt. e, at 27. 
 52. Id. § 6.03 cmt. i, illus. 15–17. 
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together. They may visit each other’s families during vacation 
periods, they may go on Spring Break together, share cars, 
computers, cooking utensils and clothes with each other, and 
sometimes “bail each other out” when credit card or rent payments 
are due. In fact, long-time college roommates could rather easily be 
found to be “domestic partners” under chapter 6. If a sexual 
relationship is added to the above facts, it is almost certain that 
under chapter 6 the college roommates would be found to be 
“domestic partners,” which could raise serious public policy 
incongruity.53 
Ironically, the drafters of chapter 6 exclude from coverage and 
any economic protection the long-time, financially dependent 
mistress or paramour whose wealthy lover visits her regularly in the 
apartment he provides for her, but who does not normally reside 
with her.54 Apparently she is to be excluded because the drafters 
curiously believe that a reasonable expectation of financial support 
cannot arise in the absence of cohabitation in a joint primary 
residence, even if one party is being entirely supported by, and living 
in a house provided by, the other. Apparently, sharing the primary 
residence is the drafters’ exclusive litmus test for reasonable 
expectations of economic sharing. 
C. Chapter 6 Provides Economic Recovery Solely as a Matter of 
Status—The New Legal Status of Domestic Partnership 
Chapter 6 provides for economic rights for domestic partners 
solely as a matter of status, as an incident of the status of domestic 
partnership. It rejects contract and reasonable expectation as the 
controlling principles for extension of financial protection to 
nonmarital domestic partners, in favor of status. In this regard it goes 
far beyond existing palimony law. Chapter 6 “relies, as do the 
marriage laws, on a status classification” as the basis for the legal 
imposition of economic obligations and claims between nonmarital 
 
 53. If, on the same facts but in the absence of sexual relations, a domestic partnership 
were not found, that would raise the incongruous policy dilemma of “rewarding” parties who 
engage in behavior that is contrary to public policy (extramarital sexual relations) but not 
extending the same legal status and benefits to parties whose economic and nonsexual 
interpersonal relations are otherwise entirely identical. 
 54. “The purpose is to exclude casual and occasional relationships, as well as extramarital 
relationships conducted by married persons who continue to reside with a spouse.” 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. c & illus. 1–2. 
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cohabitants.55 Thus, it creates a new “domestic status”—a new family 
status in the law. It equates that new family status with marriage 
both generally, as an equivalent status, and specifically, as entitled to 
exactly the same fully equal marital rights to property sharing and to 
support (alimony) after the termination of the relationship. As the 
Reporters put it, “This approach reflects a judgment that it is usually 
just to apply, to both groups [married couples and non-married 
cohabitants who qualify as domestic partners], the property and 
support rules applicable to divorcing spouses . . . .”56 In other words, 
chapter 6 is based on the policy assumption that cohabitation is the 
essence of marriage and nonmarital couples who cohabit should 
receive the same economic benefits upon dissolution as married 
couples. 
The new “status” created by chapter 6 is a modern version of 
what was called in civil law “concubinage.” Concubinage gave (and 
in Louisiana today still gives) certain legal status and economic rights 
to unmarried partners, especially (but not exclusively) mistresses of 
married men.57 
Concubinage, in some form, has existed since early recorded 
history as far back as the Book of Genesis.58 During the Roman 
Empire, concubinage was widely recognized, but only existed as an 
inferior or secondary status to marriage, and was afforded only 
certain types of legal recognition.59 The Roman concubine was a 
female cohabitor who never acquired the social or legal status of her 
male partner nor did the children of such a union. 
Concubinage was acceptable even for married men but was 
distinguished from casual love affairs because of its more permanent 
nature. It continued as a recognized institution in Rome until 
Emperor Constantine forbade it; subsequent Christian emperors 
condemned the practice and it fell into disuse. 
Concubinage, in Louisiana law as in ancient times, has 
 
 55. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b, at 19. 
 56. Id. 
 57. In recent years, there has been significant debate over whether persons of the same 
sex can have a concubinage relationship. Most courts have rejected the proposition. See 
Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d 1118, 1130 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Dial v. Dial, 636 N.E.2d 
361 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); 
but see In re Marriage of Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d 439 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 58. Gen. 35:22. 
 59. Badillo v. Tio, 6 La. Ann. 129 (La. 1851) 
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traditionally been viewed as a union between a man and a woman, 
living together as husband and wife but outside of marriage. Unlike 
marriage, it is not a civil contract and lacks the formalities required 
by our civil code.60 It differs from putative marriage in that the 
parties have no reasonable belief that they are married.61 
In chapter 6 the ALI resurrects concubinage in an expanded, 
more profitable form and calls it domestic partnership. 
The problem with creating a new domestic status is that it could 
undermine the institution of marriage, which has been the exclusive 
domestic relationship of adults in Anglo-American law for centuries. 
Unmarried persons have been able to obtain economic justice upon 
various legal and equitable doctrines including express and implied 
contract, unjust enrichment, etc., but under those doctrines recovery 
is not dependent upon and does not connote any domestic status. 
Concerns about the impact of competing domestic status institutions 
are one important reason why the status of concubinage has not 
been generally accepted in common law states, and why it has been 
abolished in most states with civil law histories.62 The effect of 
creating an official, alternative, concubinage-like status of domestic 
partnership could be just as damaging to the institution of marriage 
as recognition of concubinage. This issue was not considered by the 
ALI, and chapter 6 should not be adopted in any state until that 
matter has been carefully examined and until it is clear that creating 
domestic partnership will not detrimentally impact the integrity of 
 
 60. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 86 & 88 (1993). 
 61. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 117; Bacot, 502 So. 2d at 1127–28. See generally 
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Concubinage and Its Alternatives: A Proposal For a More Perfect 
Union, 26 LOY. L. REV. 1 (1980). 
 62. See generally Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (2000) (reviewing reasons for rejection of common law marriage 
and concubinage); Stuart J. Stein, Common Law Marriage: Its History and Certain 
Contemporary Problems, 9 J. FAM. L. 271, 276–77 (1969) (presenting history and criticism of 
common law marriage); cf. Skipworth v. Skipworth, 360 So. 2d 975, 977 (Ala. 1978) (“[I]n 
modern society many individuals realize that common law marriages have inherent legal 
problems not found in ceremonial marriages.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Note, Rules of Engagement, 
107 YALE L.J. 2583 (1998) (reviewing history of rejection of heartbalm actions because of 
abuses); see also Harry D. Krause, Essay, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same 
Sex—Or Not at All, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 298 (2000) (citing Mary Ann Glendon comparing 
nonmarital cohabitation to French concubinage). Perhaps the Reporters were implementing 
the advice of two feminists who have proposed that “concubinage” contracts be legalized to 
compensate women for their unmarried sexual relationships with men, and that the economic 
valuation of wives’ housework be increased by including sexual relations. See LINDA R. 
HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 280–83 (1998). 
13WARD.DOC 12/5/01  5:08 AM 
1189] Deconstructing Family 
 1207 
the institution of marriage. 
The use of status as the basis for recovery is dependent upon an 
assumption about the nature of cohabitation relationships that is 
seriously flawed and factually erroneous. Chapter 6 assumes that 
parties who cohabit outside of marriage in a shared primary residence 
wish to and in fact do “enjoy [the] substance” of marriage without 
the outward form.63 In fact, many people enter into nonmarital 
cohabitation to avoid marriage, particularly to avoid the economic 
responsibilities and obligations of marriage.64 And the assumption 
that cohabitation is equivalent to marriage, even when that is 
intended, is very dubious.65 
D. The Remedies Provided by Chapter 6 Are Excessive and 
Inappropriate 
1. The economic benefits conferred by chapter 6 are unprecedented 
The economic benefits conferred by chapter 6 are 
unprecedented, going far beyond those conferred upon nonmarital 
cohabitants under the most liberal existing palimony law. Section 
6.04 extends to domestic partners full and equal marital property 
rights upon dissolution. All property acquired during domestic 
partnership that would be deemed marital property if the parties had 
been married is divided between the domestic partners, and the 
parties have the exact same post-relational claims to such property 
(called “domestic partnership property”) as they would have if they 
had fully and lawfully married.66 Section 6.05 provides that upon 
termination of a domestic partnership the parties are entitled to the 
same division of property that they would have enjoyed if they had 
married. Section 6.06 provides that domestic partners are entitled to 
the same compensatory payments (alimony) that married couples 
may claim. The Reporters candidly admit that the provision for 
support goes further than any state statute and nearly all state court 
rulings have gone.67 In fact, the remedies provided are excessive 
because the property interest provided to domestic partners is not 
 
 63. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a, at 11. 
 64. The Reporters know this. See id. § 6.02 cmt. b. 
 65. See infra Parts III.D.2–3, III.G. 
 66. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.04 (1). 
 67. Id. § 6.06, Reporter’s Notes, at 59–60. 
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tailored to, and does not, provide fairness in relation to the kind of 
relationship or economic reliance and expectations associated with 
nonmarital cohabitation. 
2. Chapter 6 does not tailor the remedy or protection extended to 
domestic partnerships to the characteristics of those relationships, but 
mechanically extends to domestic partners the same property rights that 
married couples have in marital property 
The biggest single flaw of chapter 6 is that it fails to create rights 
and remedies that are customized for domestic partnership; it 
extends exactly the same economic property interests and 
compensatory rights to domestic partners as are provided to couples 
who are in the much more significant, committed, economically 
interdependent relationship of marriage. Marital property interests 
are based on the time-verified fact that most parties who marry make 
a long-term (presumably life-long) commitment to share their lives 
and their total family and personal interests, and they make 
significant adjustments in their economic life based on those 
interdependency commitments. However, it is far from clear that 
most nonmarital couples have similar expectations and make similar 
sacrifices in reliance on their expectations. Indeed, the existing social 
science evidence points in exactly the opposite direction, indicating 
that parties living in nonmarital cohabitation have very different 
expectations and characteristics than parties who are married.68 In 
the face of the overwhelming evidence of such significant differences, 
chapter 6 irrationally extends full, equal marital property and 
compensatory payment rights to domestic partners. 
In some jurisdictions, domestic partners (possibly called “de 
facto couples” or something else) already are given limited economic 
protections.69 The drafters of chapter 6 might have followed those 
models and provided that domestic partners are entitled to one-half 
(or some other proportion) of the property rights enjoyed by a 
married person, or a certain interest per year over time (less than 
 
 68. See infra Parts III.D.2–3, III.G. 
 69. See, e.g., Reg Grayear & Jenni Millbank, The Bride Wore Pink . . . to the Property 
(Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act of 1999: Relationships Law Reform in New South 
Wales, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 227 (2000); see also Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: 
Bridging the Private/Public Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 105 (2001) 
(“[O]pposite-sex cohabitation generally does not create joint rights to property acquired 
during the relationship.”). 
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enjoyed by married persons). But the ALI chose instead to grant full 
equivalent economic rights to domestic partners inter se. 
Chapter 6 assumes that parties who cohabit generally, and all 
who would meet the definition or be found to be “domestic 
partners,” merely wish to “avoid the form of marriage even as they 
enjoy its substance.”70 While empirical research indicates that young 
people today “strongly endorse cohabitation, perhaps in the 
mistaken belief that it will provide divorce insurance,”71 research 
shows that “[b]oth the general public and cohabitors themselves 
typically make a sharp distinction between marriage and 
[cohabitation].”72 They believe that “[c]ohabitation is not ‘just like 
marriage’ but . . . [a] lifestyle with a different set of social meanings, 
which generally serves different purposes. . . . [Cohabitors] flaunt 
their differences [from marriage].”73 While the minority of 
cohabitors who have “definite plans to marry [such as cohabiting 
fiancés] act and behave in ways that are similar to married couples,” 
the rest (most) are “without plans to marry [and they] look very 
different from married couples—in their health habits, in the way 
they spend their money, in the attitudes toward divorce and 
marriage, leisure and money, and in their fertility patterns.”74 
Moreover, the financial expectations of parties who cohabit differ 
markedly from persons who marry. The Reporters baldly assumed 
that the economic expectations of cohabiting couples are the same as 
the expectations of married couples.75 In fact, many people enter into 
 
 70. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a. 
 71. LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 183 (2000). 
 72. Id. at 37. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. Apparently in only a minority of cohabiting couples do both parties intend to 
marry; most cohabitations end in two years, and most do not result in marriage. Renata Forste, 
Prelude to Marriage or Alternative to Marriage? A Social Demographic Look at Cohabitation in 
the U.S., at 4 (Feb. 3, 2001) (In the 1980s, sixty percent of cohabitants married; in the 1990s, 
only thirty-five percent marry). 
 75. The Reporters assume that “as in marriage” nonmarital cohabitants “‘intend to deal 
fairly with each other.’” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. b, at 
19. While that may be true, what is “deal[ing] fairly with each other” when parties are merely 
cohabiting is not necessarily the same as what is dealing fairly with each other when parties are 
married. The Reporters believe that “as in marriage, in the ordinary case [of domestic 
partnership] the law should provide remedies at the dissolution of a domestic relationship that 
will ensure an equitable allocation of accumulated property and of the financial losses arising 
from the termination of the relationship.” Id. Again, it may be true that an equitable allocation 
should be provided upon termination of both marriages and long-term cohabitations, but what 
is equitable is not necessarily the same. Economic equity upon breakup of the relationship 
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nonmarital cohabitation to avoid marriage and particularly seek to 
avoid the economic responsibilities and obligations of marriage. Fear 
of the economic consequences of failure of a marriage is a major 
reason for people cohabiting as domestic partners rather than 
entering marriage.76 Thus, the extension in chapter 6 of exactly the 
same post-relationship property sharing rights and continuing 
support benefits to domestic partners as are provided to persons who 
have been married is indefensible and excessive. It appears to be 
more of a windfall—a reward for people who have entered into 
politically correct, preferred nonmarital relationships—than an 
accurate reflection of actual expectations or economic realities of 
those relationships. 
3. Chapter 6 endorses and establishes false equivalence to marriage 
Because the remedy provided upon dissolution is exactly the 
same, the standard and principles for granting recovery are exactly 
the same, and presumably the amount of recovery awarded will be 
exactly the same for domestic partners as for persons who have been 
married, the message of chapter 6 is that domestic partnership status 
is equivalent to marriage as an economic union. Nowhere in the 
Family Dissolution Principles do the Reporters provide any evidence 
to support that belief, and the common experience of history and 
contemporaries is the opposite.77 Chapter 6 also sends uncritically a 
message that nonmarital cohabitation of almost any two persons 
(same-sex partners, incestuous partners, adulterous partners, and all 
other nonmarital cohabitants) is just as valuable to society, just as 
important to protect and encourage in law, as marriage. That is 
neither supported nor supportable. Chapter 6 clearly conveys a 
message of relationship equivalence that is not only demonstrably 
false, but is dangerously deceptive. 
The provisions of chapter 6 that prescribe economic remedies 
 
clearly depends upon more than the amount of time the parties have lived with each other; it 
depends also upon the nature and characteristics of the relationship, the understandings and 
reliances of the parties, the allocation of responsibilities during the relationship, the assets, 
work, income, saving and spending histories and patterns of the parties, etc. The Reporters, 
however, categorically equate marriage and nonmarital cohabitation for economic purposes 
upon dissolution. Id. 
 76. See Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-
Marital Cohabitation, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 275, 325. 
 77. See infra Part III.G.2. 
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assume several dubious propositions. First, they assume that the 
nature and characteristics of those “alternative relationships” are 
essentially “the same as” traditional marital relationships. Second, 
they assume that the benefits conferred upon society by those 
relationships are just as valuable or equivalent to the benefits 
conferred upon society by traditional marital relationships. Third, 
they assume that the cost to society of conferring equivalent legal 
protections is no greater than costs associated with the conferral of 
legal status, benefits, and protections upon traditional marital 
relations. Fourth, they assume that the kinds of benefits, protection, 
status, and privileges conferred upon the alternative relationships 
should be exactly the same for domestic partners as those conferred 
upon traditional marriages, rather than customized and tailored to 
the unique contours of the particular relationship. The net effect of 
these assumptions and of chapter 6 is the deconstruction of marriage 
by the myth of false equivalence. 
By making domestic partnership a marriage-like “status” with 
equivalent financial rights inter se, the ALI creates a competing 
domestic status and sends a false message about functional 
equivalence of domestic partnership and marriage.78 Thus, chapter 6 
threatens the integrity and legal preference and protection for 
marriage by equating domestic partnership with marriage for 
purposes of property allocation and support claims upon dissolution. 
E. Chapter 6 Fails to Use or Improve Existing  
Legal and Equitable Doctrines 
Chapter 6 largely overlooks and ignores existing legal and 
equitable doctrines that have long proven useful to remedy the 
problem of economic injustice resulting from the breakup of 
significant marriage-like long-term relationships. Such doctrines and 
remedies include the unjust enrichment doctrine, quantum meruit, 
the putative spouse doctrine, doctrines of implied contract and 
implied partnership, constructive trust principles, etc. Instead of 
proposing to carefully fine-tune and develop existing legal and 
equitable doctrines, chapter 6 proposes to create a radically new legal 
status that is virtually unprecedented in American family law. This 
seems rather like using a guillotine to get rid of a severe case of 
 
 78. See supra Part III.D.2–3; infra Part III.G. 
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dandruff; there is no need to lose one’s head to solve the problem. 
The Reporters acknowledge that existing doctrines are sufficient 
to provide recovery in many cases.79 Of course, there are always cases 
in which courts do not interpret or juries do not apply existing 
equitable doctrines to everyone’s satisfaction. However, that will 
happen even under the Family Dissolution Principles; our legal 
system, judges, and juries will still be imperfect. The Reporters failed 
to show why their rules will not be subject to just as much abuse as 
existing rules and doctrines, or improved versions of them. 
The inadequacy of existing legal and equitable doctrines to 
provide an adequate remedy under new social conditions may well 
justify a thorough and careful examination of those existing doctrines 
and support for proposals to improve and update those principles 
and remedies. However, the ALI skipped that step entirely, electing 
instead to create a new family relationship status—domestic 
partnership. As fun and exciting as social engineering may be, the 
ALI must be faulted for rushing to propose a radical new domestic 
relationship rather than first exploring the possibility that improving 
existing doctrines might provide adequate or better protection 
against economic unfairness resulting from the breakup of 
nonmarital relationships. 
1. Rejection of contract 
The ALI’s disregard for existing legal doctrines goes further. For 
example, chapter 6 rejects basing domestic partnership upon actual 
contract, agreement, or intent. The Reporters for chapter 6 explicitly 
declare: “This section thus does not require, as a predicate to finding 
the existence of a domestic partnership, that the parties had an 
implied or express agreement, or even that the facts meet the 
standard requirements of a quantum meruit claim.”80 This is ironic 
because the drafters of chapter 6 invoke contract principles to justify 
 
 79. For instance, they acknowledge that the unjust enrichment doctrine was successfully 
used to allow recovery as in Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987). PRINCIPLES 
(Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03, Reporter’s Notes, at 41. There the jury awarded 
a woman $113,000 on her claim of unjust enrichment; she and the defendant had lived 
together for a dozen years, they had two children, and he had once executed a will that gave 
her ten percent of his property. The jury awarded her a little more than ten percent of his net 
worth at the end of the relationship under the equitable doctrine. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303. 
 80. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b. 
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legalization of domestic partnership by operation of law.81 Yet they 
set the ordinary contract principle on its head. Contract principles 
protect individuals against being bound by obligations unless they 
affirmatively opt in by accepting those obligations. The ALI, 
however, proposes to bind individuals to a contract that they have 
not made, to obligations they have not chosen to assume, to 
commitments they have not agreed to assume, by the tactic of 
putting the burden of the individuals to act affirmatively to opt out 
or those obligations and commitments will be imposed by default.82 
How will a couple opt out of the default domestic partnership 
provisions of chapter 6? It appears that lawyers will be required to 
help them do so. The “opt out” must be by express agreement. Such 
agreements (as regulated by chapter 7 of the Family Dissolution 
Principles, for example) are quite technical and subject to very 
precise limitations, qualifications, and conditions. To provide reliable 
protection, the couple seeking to avoid domestic partnership by 
operation of law will need to obtain the services of an attorney—
indeed, they will probably require the services of two attorneys.83 
Thus, most lower and middle income couples will not consider 
opting out to be a realistic option for them. And higher income 
couples who wish to opt out will have to pay dearly for the privilege, 
as legal services do not come cheaply. 
The Reporters propose to implement a set of default rules—in 
effect, a contract imposed by law on parties who do not explicitly 
express their agreement to some different set of rules.84 The default 
position (and shifting the burden to opt out) might be justified if it 
reflected social expectations, but that is not the case in this instance. 
Most people who enter nonmarital cohabitation deliberately choose 
not to assume the financial responsibilities of marriage that chapter 6 
imposes on domestic partners.85 Chapter 6 assumes exactly the 
 
 81. See generally id. § 6.03 cmt. b. 
 82. Id. The ALI scheme is reminiscent of the tactic of vendors who send advertisements 
offering one month’s free subscription (and in the fine print add that unless you affirmatively 
opt out thereafter, they will continue to send you the product every month at an exorbitant 
charge, which will continue until you affirmatively act to cancel the subscription); however, 
unlike the ALI, those merchants do not impose the obligation on the buyers to affirmatively 
opt out until after they have affirmatively indicated their choice to opt in (by returning the 
postcard that says “I subscribe”). 
 83. Id. § 7.05(3)(b). 
 84. Id. § 6.02 cmt. a. 
 85. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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opposite. Thus, chapter 6 is ultimately anti-consent. 
In one sense, chapter 6 proposes compulsory economic marriage. 
It proposes to force the economic obligations of marriage upon all 
persons who cohabit.86 It will impose upon virtually all cohabitants 
(all who do not engage an attorney and execute a document that 
explicitly opts out) the full economic obligations and duties of 
marriage. It reflects the drafters’ strong policy preference for linking 
economic obligations enforceable upon dissolution with 
cohabitation. Ironically, this pro-marriage policy proposal of chapter 
6 overshoots the mark because consent, agreement, and contract are 
essential to marriage.87 
2. Rejection of reasonable expectation 
Chapter 6 also rejects reasonable expectation as the basis for 
recovery as domestic partners. While it appears to assume (not 
unreasonably) that cohabitation in a primary residence for a 
significant period of time creates a reasonable expectation of some 
economic interdependence, on close inspection it turns out that an 
actual reasonable expectation to share in a marriage-like economic 
relationship is not required to recover marriage-like property 
interests and alimony rights, nor is lack of reasonable expectation to 
share economic benefits a sufficient protection against an unexpected 
claim under chapter 6. For example, one of the factors included in 
the black letter law of section 6.03 as evidence that the parties are 
domestic partners is participation in some “form of commitment 
ceremony or registration as a domestic partnership that, under 
applicable law, does not give rise to the rights and obligations” of 
domestic partnership.88 Even if the parties investigated the law and 
determined that going through a private commitment ceremony or 
having their relationship blessed or solemnized in some religious 
fashion would not give rise to any financial obligations to each other 
(and based upon that understanding they proceeded) and even if the 
 
 86. See generally Press Release, Stephen Franks, New Zealand M.P., Government Moves 
to Marry Thousands Today (May 4, 2000) (on file with author). 
 87. For similar objections to a New Zealand bill, see Press Release, Stephen Franks, 
New Zealand M.P., Grim Year Ahead Likely for Many De Facto Couples (autodated) (on file 
with author); Stephen Franks, New Zealand M.P., What’s the Fuss Over De Facto and Same 
Sex Property Law? (June 18, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). While I 
confess that I like the incentive to marry, I dislike the tactic. 
 88. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(7)(j) (emphasis added). 
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law of the state where that relationship was created or where the 
parties resided explicitly provided that it did not give rise to 
economic rights and obligations, under chapter 6 the ceremony 
would be considered evidence of and could provide a basis for the 
imposition of the very economic responsibilities of domestic partners 
that the parties intended and reasonably expected to avoid. 
The Reporters have categorically assumed that virtually all such 
cohabiting couples (except those who explicitly and properly opt 
out) wish to and in fact do “avoid the form of marriage even as they 
enjoy its [economic] substance.”89 In fact, many people enter into 
domestic partnerships because they wish to avoid marriage and 
particularly to avoid the economic responsibilities and obligations of 
marriage.90 Chapter 6 differs significantly from some other chapters 
of the Principles because it does not require evidence of the intent or 
reasonable expectations of the parties. By contrast, for example, one 
only becomes a “de facto parent” upon a finding of evidence of a 
reasonable expectation of the parental relationship (including 
permission of the biological parent).91 
The failure to protect reasonable expectations of separate 
financial interests will surely harm some women because in some 
cultures, especially in some minority ethnic communities, women do 
most of the saving. For example, critics of a similar proposal in New 
Zealand wrote: 
What about the woman who has carefully saved a nest egg from her 
useless boyfriend. She could see half of it go with him if she lets 
him stay for over three years because she was lonely. 
. . . . 
“This certainty of litigation will impose great costs on Maori solo 
mothers and the legal aid system,” said Donna Awatere Huata. 
In Maori society it is practically always women who do the saving. 
 
 89. Id. § 6.02 cmt. a. 
 90. See Fineman, supra note 76, at 325; see also Twila L. Perry, Dissolution Planning in 
Family Law: A Critique of Current Analyses and a Look Toward the Future, 24 FAM. L.Q. 77, 
91 (1990); Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering Baehr: 
On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 921, 983–84 (1995). 
 91. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 2.03(1)(c). 
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This provides security for the children and herself when her partner 
abandons his responsibilities. 
Yet when this flawed legislation becomes law, Maori women will be 
at great risk of losing half of their hard earned assets to the 
absconding male.92 
Since chapter 6 subordinates subjective expectations to strong 
presumptions and pro-partnership principles, similar results would 
occur under the ALI Principles as well. 
Thus, chapter 6 goes far beyond Marvin v. Marvin,93 the seminal 
California case famous for marking the extreme boundary of existing 
“palimony” rules. Ultimately, the claimant in the Marvin case 
(Michelle) was unable to recover on her claim because she failed to 
establish any facts which would provide any reasonable expectation 
of recovery under any legal or equitable principle or doctrine.94 The 
Reporters for chapter 6, however, indicate that under chapter 6 a 
strong “presumption arises” that Michelle would recover as a 
domestic partner.95 Chapter 6 thus exceeds even the extreme Marvin 
decision. 
3. Rejection of “good faith belief” requirement of the putative spouse 
doctrine 
Similarly, the rejection of the time-proven element of the 
putative spouse doctrine that requires a good faith belief in the 
validity of the marriage is very unwise. The Reporters explain that 
“[k]nowledge that a domestic partner is married to another does not 
alone bar claims under [Chapter 6].”96 Under the putative spouse 
doctrine, the cohabitant who is living with someone who is married 
to another cannot collect as a putative spouse unless he or she had a 
 
 92. Press Release, Stephen Franks & Donna Awatere Huata, New Zealand M.P.s, Select 
Committee Scrutiny a Must (Feb 28, 2001) (on file with author). 
 93. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 94. Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 556–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). The court 
found that Michelle failed to establish as a matter of fact that Lee Marvin had made any express 
or implied agreement to divide his property with her or to be a financial partner with her or to 
provide post-cohabitation support for her. It further found that Michelle had been richly 
rewarded during cohabitation for her contributions to the relationship and concluded that Lee 
had not been enriched neither materially nor unjustly. 
 95. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. d, illus. 6. 
 96. Id. § 6.01 cmt. d, at 7. 
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good faith belief in the lawfulness of the purported marriage to the 
putative spouse.97 The Reporters instead note: “By contrast, the basis 
for the accrual of rights between the parties under this Chapter is the 
character of their social relationship. Knowledge that one or both 
parties are married to another person is not conceptually inconsistent 
with the assertion of claims under this Chapter.”98 (This apparently 
reflects Reporter Professor Ellman’s hostility to the notion of moral 
accountability having any role to play in marital dissolution law in 
America.)99 
The reason for the “good faith belief” requirement of the 
putative spouse doctrine is to protect the integrity of the monogamy 
rule that one person may have only one spouse at one time.100 It 
protects that rule by refusing to extend financial protections to 
persons even who celebrate marriage if they have reason to believe 
that they or their spouse is still married to someone else. Thus, the 
ALI position refuses to protect the monogamy principle; indeed, it 
flatly declares that monogamy is wholly irrelevant to any recovery. It 
is merely “the character of their social relationship” that justifies their 
being able to assert a claim. On the other hand, it was precisely “the 
character of their social relationship”—bigamous, disfavored, and 
contrary to public policy supporting monogamous marriage—that 
was the principle underlying the good faith rule of the putative 
spouse doctrine. 
F. Chapter 6 Is Drafted Ambiguously, Abstractly, and Incompletely 
In addition to the errors relating to deconstruction and leveling 
of family relations, chapter 6 contains some significant practical and 
drafting errors. It leaves too many essential questions unanswered. 
 
 
 97. Id.; see also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 55 (2d ed., 1988) (“The good faith of the party who asserts a claim based on 
the marriage is required.”). 
 98. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, at 7–8; see also Christopher L. 
Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
 99. See generally Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic 
Persistence of Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1 (2000); Ira Mark Ellman, The 
Maturing Law of Divorce Finances: Toward Rules and Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 801 (1999); 
Ira Mark Ellman, Inventing Family Law, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855 (1999). 
 100. See, e.g., Blakesley, supra note 98, at 18–19; see also supra note 40 and 
accompanying text (confusion over whether polygamists are covered under chapter 6). 
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1. Chapter 6 fails to provide specific information essential for equitable 
economic justice for cohabitants 
As a matter of drafting, one of the weaknesses of chapter 6 is that 
it recommends adopting rules that depend upon a specific time 
variable to be fair, but then it refuses to recommend a specific time. 
For example, in section 6 a rebuttable presumption of domestic 
partnership arises if the parties “have maintained a common 
household . . . for a continuous period that equals or exceeds a 
duration, called the cohabitation period, set in a uniform rule of 
statewide application.”101 The Reporters decline to suggest a specific 
time for the cohabitation period (perhaps for tactical political 
reasons). Likewise, an irrebuttable presumption of domestic 
partnership arises if a couple “have maintained a common 
household . . . with their common child . . . for a continuous period 
that equals or exceeds a duration, called the cohabitation parenting 
period, set in a uniform rule of statewide application.”102 Again, the 
drafters fail to define how long that period should be. The omission 
is not insignificant; in each case a legal presumption arises if, but only 
if, the parties have cohabited for the undefined time period. Whether 
or not it is wise, just, and fair to presume as a matter of law that a 
domestic partnership has been established (and interdependent 
financial obligations assumed) by cohabiting for a period of time 
depends upon what period of time. For example, if the parties have 
maintained a common household for twenty-one years, most people 
would think it fair to impose financial obligations similar to domestic 
partnership, but if they have only maintained a common household 
for twenty-one days the general sentiment might be very different. 
The problem with chapter 6 is that it does not identify what that 
period should be—whether it should be long, extremely long, short, 
or extremely short. That is ironic because the Reporters base their 
argument for legalization of domestic partnership on the notion that 
it is “just” and “fair” and “equitable.”103 To claim that fairness 
 
 101. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(3). 
 102. Id. § 6.03(2). 
 103. Id. § 6.02 & cmt. b. The Reporters also note: 
[O]ne court [has] observed that it is appropriate in these cases to presume “that the 
parties intend to deal fairly with each other.” This suggests that, as in marriage, in 
the ordinary case the law should provide remedies at the dissolution of a domestic 
relationship that will ensure an equitable allocation of accumulated property and of 
the financial losses arising from the termination of the relationship . . . . [Chapter 6] 
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mandates the change of law they propose and then retreat from one 
of the most important factors that determine fairness—how long the 
parties have lived together—undermines the justifying principle. It 
also raises a concern that chapter 6 could be abused (or was 
intended) to impose unfair economic obligations in a strict liability 
way upon those who have shared a common household and life for 
only a very short period of time.104 
Likewise, chapter 6 wisely limits its application to the rights of 
the parties upon the termination of the relationship. Third parties 
cannot use the status to recover from a domestic partner. However, 
the Reporters provide no principled basis for limiting the application 
of their economic “fairness” principle in that way. For example, why 
should long-time domestic partners not be able to sue negligent 
drivers and employers for loss of consortium when short-time 
spouses can recover? Why should the economic rights upon death be 
different from the rights upon separation? While there are some 
good answers to such questions, the Reporters give none of them. 
By drawing lines without giving justifications for those limits, the 
Reporters appear arbitrary and invite quick erosion of the lines they 
have drawn. The failure to articulate any justification for not 
extending the right to recover to third parties suggests that the 
Reporters were not persuaded that there were any good reasons for 
the limitation, that they favor erosion of the line they have drawn, 
and that they have drawn the line solely for temporary, strategic 
reasons of political expediency. It looks like a Trojan horse. 
2. Chapter 6 is too abstract and invites litigation 
Chapter 6 makes some distinctions that may make sense in the 
abstract but are very difficult to apply in courtrooms and litigation. 
For instance, the authors emphasize that even though their 
definition of domestic partnership is extremely broad, it is not 
intended to include persons who merely live in “group living 
arrangements, such as dormitories or shared houses.”105 The 
difference, the Reporters indicate, depends upon whether they are 
 
shifts the burden of showing a contract to the party who wishes to avoid such 
fairness-based remedies . . . . 
Id. § 6.03 cmt. b, at 19. 
 104. Likewise, section 6.03(6) suffers from this flaw. 
 105. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. I, at 34. 
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living in such arrangements “as an individual” rather than as a 
“couple.”106 Conceptually that may be a coherent distinction, but at 
the level of trial and proof, it is an extremely ambiguous distinction. 
What about two individuals who live together in a house in an 
ongoing sexual relationship, but they have their own separate 
bedrooms? What if they share utility and food costs, but have 
separate cars and separate bank accounts? What about couples who 
share a bedroom, share sexual relations, are socially recognized as “a 
couple” but keep all of their living expenses separate? What if sex is 
not involved? The variations are innumerable and the litigation will 
be interminable.107 
Even in cases of relatively short cohabitation periods, subsections 
6.03(6) and (7) leave the courthouse door open for parties to 
establish domestic partnership. They invite couples who break up 
before the minimum period of time to litigate anyway. And they 
make the invitation even more attractive by creating a laundry list of 
thirteen factors that can help them prove their claim of domestic 
partnership despite the short period of time they lived together. 
Thus, chapter 6 invites litigation. In fact, it requires legal services 
twice. First, in order to avoid application of chapter 6, parties 
cohabiting or intending to cohabit will need to obtain legal services 
to draft an agreement that their relationship not be governed by 
chapter 6.108 Because of the ambiguities of the chapter, it is virtually 
certain that only professionally prepared agreements will be 
sufficient; such vague drafting guarantees employment for two 
lawyers at the outset of the relationship. Second, because section 
6.03 is so broad and so inviting, it encourages less wealthy or 
dissatisfied parties to file domestic partner claims upon the breakup 
of the relationship. Again, legal services (of two attorneys) are 
required. Whatever the result, the lawyers win, as do the courts who 
have more work for (more) judges. Only the parties (at least one of 
them) will lose. 
Some provisions of chapter 6 are tautological. For example, 
whether unrelated persons are family (domestic partners) depends in 
part upon whether they “share a primary residence,”109 with “family 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. See supra Part III.A. 
 108.  See supra Part III.E.1. 
 109. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(1), (4). 
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members.” Whether the people they live with are “family members” 
may depend upon whether they are “domestic partners.”110 
The noble experiment proposed by chapter 6 is not entirely 
dissimilar to Utah’s recent experience with common law marriage. 
The Utah Legislature enacted a statute approximately one decade 
ago creating common law marriage.111 It was based, like chapter 6, 
on an economic fairness concern—it was enacted to eliminate welfare 
fraud.112 Since then, however, common law marriage claims have 
plagued the courts, and none of them has arisen in the context 
targeted by the legislature—welfare fraud. There have been 
tremendous proof problems, interpretation issues, and judicial calls 
for reconsideration of the legislation.113 This is similar to the 
experience that led many other states (approximately forty) to 
abolish common law marriage. The problems that have led to the 
rejection of common law marriage are unavoidable under chapter 6 
in claims for domestic partnership. 
3. Chapter 6 creates very serious conflict of laws questions that have not 
been examined 
Because of loose drafting, a very serious conflict of laws question 
is raised by section 6.03(7)(j), which explicitly authorizes the court 
to disregard otherwise applicable law. If the parties have participated 
in the commitment ceremony and registered as domestic partners in 
a state where that ceremony or registration “does not give rise to the 
rights and obligations established by this Chapter,”114 section 
6.03(7)(j) provides that a court hearing a domestic partnership claim 
may rely on the fact of such ceremony or registration to impose the 
financial rights and obligations of domestic partnership anyway. The 
other state’s law may be completely disregarded. The Reporters 
provide no qualification, condition, or limit to this factor. Vested 
 
 110. Id. § 6.03(4). 
 111. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (2000) (enacted in 1987). 
 112. Because couples who were married and applied for welfare had to count all of the 
income of both of the parties, but persons who were cohabiting and applied for welfare 
apparently did not have to include the income of their nonmarital cohabitants, the legislature 
enacted common law marriage to prevent “welfare fraud.” See In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1 
P.3d 1074, 1078 (Utah 2000); Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 182–84 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 113. Kelley, 9 P.3d at 182–84 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 114. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(7)(j). 
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rights and protections created by other law (the right to protection 
against economic obligations and the right to keep one’s own 
property and earnings) are to be ignored categorically, even if that 
other state has the most significant relationship with the parties and 
the relationship. This is apparently true even if the forum state does 
not have any significant relationship at all with the parties or their 
co-residence, which could violate the Due Process and Full Faith and 
Credit clauses of the Constitution.115  
The same problems arise with respect to section 6.03(7)(k), 
where the fact that parties have participated in “a void or voidable 
marriage that, under applicable law, does not give rise to the 
economic incidents of marriage”116 may be the basis for the 
imposition of the economic incidents of marriage under chapter 6. 
Again, this appears to be true even if the forum state has no 
significant interest in applying its law and even if the only state that 
has an interest in applying its law is the other state in which the 
couple resided exclusively and created their relationship. 
The choice of law issues are not insubstantial in quantitative 
terms, either. As of January 1, 2001, seventy-seven percent of the 
same-sex couples who had registered “civil unions” under the new 
Vermont law allowing same-sex couples to acquire that new legal 
status were from outside of Vermont.117 Gay or lesbian couples from 
forty-seven states have registered civil unions in Vermont. The status 
recognition and choice of law issues that will attend efforts to force 
other states to recognize the domestic partnership status and give 
legal benefits to domestic partnerships under chapter 6, likewise, are 
not merely idle academic concerns. 
G. It Is Contrary to the Best Interests of Society to Legalize Same-Sex 
Domestic Partnerships and to Legitimize and Promote Nonmarital 
Cohabitation as Chapter 6 Does 
The good intentions or objectives noted in Part II are not the 
 
 115. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (concluding that Constitution 
is violated if jurisdiction whose law is applied has no significant contacts with the parties to 
transaction); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (finding that due process was 
violated when applied Texas law to parties and accident in Mexico, where there were no 
contacts with Texas). 
 116. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(7)(k). 
 117. E-mail from Bill Apao, Vt. Dep’t of Health, forwarded to Lynn D. Wardle, the 
author of this article, by Wendy Herdlein (Feb. 14, 2001) (on file with author). 
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only goals of chapter 6, but ultimately seem to attract support for a 
much more radical ideological agenda—including legalization of 
same-sex domestic partnerships. Chapter 6 generally legalizes same-
sex domestic partnerships, a step that has been repeatedly rejected by 
the voters of the American states. It also legitimizes and provides 
significant financial incentives to heterosexual couples to enter into 
nonmarital cohabitation, which can be clearly detrimental to the 
parties who cohabit, to their children, and to society. 
1. Chapter 6 extends to same-sex couples a legal status (domestic 
partnership) that is fully equivalent to marriage in terms of the 
economic status, rights, and duties of the parties inter se upon breakup 
of the relationship 
In some respects, chapter 6 seems designed primarily to extend 
to same-sex couples a legal status (domestic partnership) that is fully 
equivalent to marriage in terms of the economic status, rights, and 
duties of the parties inter se upon breakup of the relationship. The 
black letter provisions and the Reporters’ comments explicitly and 
repeatedly emphasize that same-sex couples are included in chapter 6 
domestic partnerships.118 While chapter 6 thwarts the expectations 
and understandings of most heterosexual nonmarital cohabitants 
(that cohabitation does not entail marriage-like economic 
commitment), it fulfills the frustrated yearnings of the gay and 
lesbian community for some marriage-like legal status for same-sex 
relationships.119 
Only one state (Vermont) gives general domestic partnership 
status to same-sex couples, and one other (Hawaii) does so 
restrictively.120 Yet the ALI has clearly designed chapter 6 to endorse 
 
 118. The Reporters cite with approval the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling in Baehr v. 
Lewin (and Baehr v. Miicke) (later overturned by a constitutional amendment passed 
overwhelmingly by more than two-thirds of the citizens of Hawaii). They similarly cite with 
approval the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. State and the legalization of same-
sex civil unions there. The commentary and notes emphasize that same-sex couples are eligible 
for domestic partnership status and that moral (public policy) concerns relating to sexual 
behavior ought to be excluded from consideration in determining financial obligations and 
interests between nonmarital domestic partners. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), 
supra note 1, § 6.01(1); id. § 6.03(1) & cmts. b, d & illus. 7–9; id. Reporter’s Notes, at 39, 
46–49. 
 119. See generally id. § 6.03 Reporter’s Notes, at 39, 46–49. 
 120. Vermont has created a scheme of “Civil Union” registrations allowing same-sex 
couples to obtain marital property and alimony benefits similar to those provided by chapter 6 
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and promote same-sex domestic partnership. That is out of step with 
the position taken by the people of every state that have had the 
chance to vote on the question of whether state laws should extend 
to same-sex couples the same or equivalent status enjoyed in law by 
married heterosexual couples.121 Same-sex domestic partnership is 
clearly a step toward same-sex marriage. Chapter 6 clearly proposes 
to take that initial step. 
2. There are compelling public interest reasons not to legitimate 
heterosexual nonmarital cohabitation 
The Reporters provide a rose-colored view of why people enter 
domestic partnership rather than getting married. Indeed they 
describe noble nonmarital cohabitation in glowing terms.122 
However, empirical research has been done in the past twenty years 
on nonmarital cohabitation, and the picture that emerges of those 
relationships is not appealing. One of the most complete 
compilations of data on outcomes of nonmarital cohabitation in the 
United States, done by David Popenoe and Barbara Dafoe 
Whitehead, found that “virtually all research on the topic has 
determined that the chances of divorce ending a marriage preceded 
by cohabitation are significantly greater than for a marriage not 
preceded by cohabitation.”123 Likewise, “[a]ccording to recent 
studies cohabitants tend not to be as committed as married couples 
in their dedication to the continuation of the relationship . . . , and 
they are more oriented toward their own personal autonomy.”124 
“Most cohabiting relationships are relatively short lived . . . . In 
 
by pre-registration. Hawaii allows registration for limited benefits as “reciprocal beneficiaries.” 
When Hawaii’s domestic partner benefit law passed, state officials predicted that 20,000 people 
would sign up, but by the end of 1997, fewer than 300 had signed up. David Albertson, 
Hawaii’s Domestic Partners Benefit Law Serves Few but Saves Precedent for Others, EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT NEWS, Apr. 1, 1998. 
 121. In Hawaii, Alaska, California, Nevada, and Nebraska, voters have resoundingly 
preserved the unique status, benefits, and protections of marriage for male-female couples. 
 122. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02; id. § 6.03 & cmt. a; 
id. Reporter’s Notes, at 36–39. Quotes from the Reporter’s Notes may be of interest to 
readers here. 
 123. DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE NATIONAL MARRIAGE 
PROJECT, SHOULD WE LIVE TOGETHER? WHAT YOUNG ADULTS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
COHABITATION BEFORE MARRIAGE 4 (1999), available at http://www.smart-
marriages.com/cohabit.html (last visited June 12, 1999). 
 124. Id. at 5. 
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general, cohabiting relationships tend to be less satisfactory than 
marriage relationships.”125  
Annual rates of depression among cohabiting couples are more 
than three times what they are among married couples. And 
women in cohabiting relationships are more likely than married 
women to suffer physical and sexual abuse. Some research has 
shown that aggression is at least twice as common among 
cohabitors as it is among married partners.126  
Linda Waite’s review of the National Survey of Families and 
Households data revealed that when cohabiting couples argue they 
are more than three times as likely to resort to physical violence than 
are married couples, a finding supported by several other studies.127 
Studies also indicate that with cohabiting couples there are “far 
higher levels of child abuse than is found in intact families.”128 Child 
sexual abuse is much higher for children whose biological parent or 
parents are only cohabiting rather than married.129 “[T]hree quarters 
of children born to cohabiting parents will see their parents split up 
before they reach age sixteen, whereas only about a third of children 
born to married parents face a similar fate.”130 Likewise, “[w]hile the 
1996 poverty rate for children living in married couple households 
was about 6%, it was 31% for children living in cohabiting 
households.”131 Another study notes that cohabiting men are four 
 
 125. Id. at 6. Popenoe and Whitehead note the 1980s data showing that about sixty 
percent of cohabitants married. Id. In the 1990s, however, that rate of cohabitant marriage fell 
to about thirty-five percent. Forste, supra note 74. 
 126. POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, supra note 123, at 7. 
 127. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 71, at 155; see also POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, 
supra note 123, at 7 (“[A]ggression is at least twice as common among cohabitors as it is 
among married partners.”); Faith Abbott, No Bomb, No Book, 24 HUM. LIFE REV. 31, 43 
(1998) (citing a 1993 British study by the Family Education Trust that used data on 
documented cases of child abuse and neglect between 1982 and 1988 and “found that—
compared with a stable nuclear family—the incidence of abuse was thirty-three times higher 
when the mother was living with a boyfriend not related to the child. And even when the live-
in boyfriend was the biological father of the children, the chances of abuse were still twenty 
times more likely.”); Dean M. Busby, Violence in the Family, in 1 FAMILY RESEARCH, A 60-
YEAR REVIEW, 1930–1990 335, 361 (Steven J. Bahr ed., 1991) (“Yllo and Straus (1981) . . . 
found that cohabiting couples had higher rates of violence than married couples. Severe 
violence was almost five times as likely in cohabitating relationships [than in marriages].”). 
 128. POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, supra note 123, at 8. 
 129. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 71, at 159. 
 130. POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, supra note 123, at 7. 
 131. Id. at 8. 
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times more likely than husbands to cheat on their partners, and 
cohabiting women are eight times more likely than wives to be 
unfaithful to their partners.132 A recent study of the relationship of 
marital status and individual happiness reported that a strong positive 
relationship between marital status and personal happiness exists in 
sixteen of the seventeen nations examined.133 The report found that 
being married increased happiness equally for men and for women in 
the nations examined, and marriage was more than three times more 
closely associated with happiness than was nonmarital cohabitation. 
In light of evidence like this, it is simply irrational for the ALI to 
recommend in chapter 6 that states should legitimate nonmarital 
cohabitation and give it the strong endorsement of providing post-
termination economic consequences equivalent to those provided to 
married parties. 
H. Chapter 6 Would Significantly Weaken the Institution of Marriage 
Legalizing domestic partnership as proposed by chapter 6 could 
significantly weaken marriage. The overwhelming majority of young 
people today yearn to get married,134 yet they are also frightened of 
marriage because they have personally experienced or witnessed 
repeatedly in the lives of their loved ones and friends the personal 
trauma of marital failure and divorce. These vulnerable young people 
may be drawn to the dangerous alternative of nonmarital domestic 
partnership if it is legalized. 
Despite the Reporters’ assurances that chapter 6 will not 
encourage young people to enter into nonmarital cohabitation,135 
there are good reasons to believe that if chapter 6 were adopted 
more couples would choose nonmarital cohabitation instead of 
marriage. For example, nonmarital cohabitation increased 
dramatically after the famous Marvin v. Marvin case and similar 
“palimony” cases in courts in other states in the 1970s and early 
1980s. Between 1970 (just six years before Marvin) and 1999 (just 
 
 132. The Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles, at http://www.marriagemove-
ment.org (June 29, 2000). 
 133. Steven Stack & J. Ross Eshleman, Marital Status and Happiness: A 17-Nation 
Study, 60 J. MARR. & FAM. 527 (1998). 
 134. Waite and Gallagher report that “[n]inety-four percent of college freshmen in one 
1997 survey said they personally hoped to get married. Just 3 percent didn’t hope to marry.” 
WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 71, at 183. 
 135. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. b. 
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twenty-three years after Marvin) the number of unmarried 
heterosexual couples living together rose more than 800 percent.136 
During the same time period, the rate of marriage fell dramatically.137 
While cause and effect relations between legal changes and social 
changes are hard to pin down exactly, at least it can be reasonably 
said that there might be some causal connection. 
Scandinavian countries have had heterosexual domestic 
partnership for nearly a half century and have recognized same-sex 
domestic partnership for about a dozen years. The experience of 
those countries also suggests that legalizing domestic partnership will 
weaken marriage. First, it appears that the legalization of domestic 
partnership only occurs after the institution of marriage has already 
been significantly weakened and devalued in society. Thus, the fact 
that the ALI is proposing legalization of domestic partnership is a 
significant indication that the institution of marriage in the United 
States is already in distress in terms of loss of social position and 
vitality. Second, after domestic partnership is legalized, it appears 
that the institution of marriage rarely recovers its position in society. 
The demographer William Goode suggests that after marriage is 
weakened in a society it is nearly impossible to revitalize it without 
some traumatic and dramatic external pressure such as military 
conquest, economic collapse, or natural disaster of widespread 
proportions.138 It is very difficult to put the genie back in the bottle. 
So before starting down the road to domestic partnership, we had 
better be very sure that it leads in a direction we want to go—for 
history suggests that it is a one-way street. 
 
 136. Statistical Abstract of the United States 2000 (U.S. DePart of Commerce, 
Economics, and Statistics Admin., U.S. Census Bureau) at 55, Table No. 60 [hereinafter 
Statistical Abstract 2000] (from 1,589 in 1980 to 4,486 in 1999); id. at 52, Table No. 57 
(41.1% of women 15–44 in 1995 had cohabitated); id. at 51, Table No. 53 (24.1% of 
population in 1980 never married; 29.0% in 1999); Statistical Abstract of the United States 
1995 (U.S. DePart of Commerce, Economics, and Statistics Admin., U.S. Census Bureau) at 
55, Table No. 60 (523,000 cohabitants in 1970). 
 137. Statistical Abstract 2000 at 51, Table No. 53 (from 65.5% in 1980 to 59.5% in 
1999); Statistical Abstract of the United States 1977 (U.S. DePart of Commerce, Economics, 
and Statistics Admin., U.S. Census Bureau) at 38, Table No. 48 (married population 71.7% in 
1970, 69.6% in 1976). 
 138. WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATTERNS 318, 335–36 
(1993). 
13WARD.DOC 12/5/01  5:08 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1228 
IV. THE DECONSTRUCTION OF FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS IS A 
PERSISTENT THEME OF THE ALI PRINCIPLES 
Chapter 6 is not the only chapter of the Family Dissolution 
Principles containing provisions that are hostile to marriage and 
marriage-based families. That ideological bias tilts most of the 
chapters of the Principles. For example, the Principles purport to 
consider comprehensively the subject of “family dissolution,”139 but 
the ALI totally refused to consider grounds for dissolution—that 
topic was not even on the table.140 Since there is a well-recognized, 
growing national movement to reform unilateral no-fault divorces,141 
the omission is neither inadvertent nor nonpolitical. The Reporters 
apparently were so committed to unilateral no-fault divorce that they 
would not risk allowing that subject to come up for discussion.142 
The provisions of chapter 2 of the Principles, dealing with the 
allocation of custodial and decision-making responsibilities for 
children, deconstruct legal parenthood just like chapter 6 
deconstructs marriage by increasing the categories of persons who 
can claim that privileged status and position. Chapter 2 extends 
significant parental status, standing, rights, privileges, and 
protections to adults who are not biological, adoptive, or marital 
parents (the traditional categories of legal parents). Section 2.03 
extends parental rights to “parents by estoppel,” and “de facto 
parents,” as well as “legal parents.” The chapter 2 provisions also 
give standing not only to those three groups of people, but allow 
intervention by other interested persons who may not come within 
 
 139. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS, 1–16 (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part I, Mar. 20, 1998) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I)]. 
 140. This harmonizes with the philosophy of chapter 6, which effectively allows the 
unilateral creation of the domestic partnership status whenever either cohabiting party wants to 
create it. Established unilateral no-fault divorce principles, which the Reporters protected 
against reform, provide for the termination of the marital status relationship any time either 
party wants to end it. 
 141. See Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and 
Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783 (1999). 
 142. This should come as no surprise for anyone who has read the law review writings of 
Ira Mark Ellman, the lead Reporter for the Family Dissolution Principles, who is an emphatic 
defender of unilateral no-fault divorce. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive 
Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers Should Look Instead to the American Law Institute, 11 INT’L 
J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 216 (1997); see also supra note 99. 
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any of those categories.143 Child custody and visitation disputes will 
have the potential to become community free-for-alls. (This is taking 
the “it takes a village to raise a child” metaphor to a ludicrous 
extreme.) Other sections of chapter 2 provide that sexual orientation 
(which the comments suggest includes ongoing homosexual 
behavior) of the contestants may not even be considered in resolving 
custody issues.144 The comments categorically (and erroneously) 
proclaim, with eyes closed to numerous studies to the contrary, that 
there is no evidence that homosexuality of a parent harms or 
jeopardizes children raised by such parents.145 Infidelity by one 
contestant may not be considered in the custody proceeding unless 
the faithful parent carries the expensive burden of establishing 
(usually by hiring a child psychiatrist or psychologist) that the 
infidelity has been harmful to the child (rather than the unfaithful 
parent bearing the burden of showing no harm from the 
infidelity).146 
One of the major effects of the substantially expanded notion of 
parenthood under chapter 2 of the Principles are that the lesbian 
partner of a biological mother will be able to assert parental rights 
and continue to interfere in the parent-child relationship of the 
biological mother and child. Moreover, chapter 2 provides a basis for 
manipulation to continue such relationships—the nonmarital 
cohabitant being able to make a very credible threat to a biological 
parent that “if you don’t stay with me, I will sue for and get custody 
of your child, and you’ll be left without a partner and without a 
child.”147 Those kinds of claims, which can be very threatening and 
 
 143. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 2.04. 
 144. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 139, § 2.14(1)(d). 
 145. See, e.g., ROBERT K. LERNER & ALTHEA K. NAGAI, MARRIAGE LAW PROJECT, NO 
BASIS: WHAT THE STUDIES DON’T TELL US ABOUT SAME-SEX PARENTING (2001); Judith 
Stacey & Timothy Biblars, How Does Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 
159 (2001); Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997). 
 146. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 139, § 2.14(1)(e). 
 147. A few years ago I was consulted by a lawyer who was handling precisely that kind of 
case. A young woman who had a child in a relationship with a man that went sour moved in 
with an older woman who was a lesbian and who was financially well off. The young mother 
and her child were supported for a relatively short period of time by the older lesbian. Then 
the mother decided that she did not want to continue that relationship and moved out. She 
allowed continued contact between her former partner and her child for a short period of time 
but then determined that it was not in the best interests of her child to allow further contact by 
the lesbian ex-partner. The lesbian ex-partner filed suit to obtain parental relations (visitation). 
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disruptive to the child and to the mother-child relationship, will 
surely proliferate (as will litigation to enforce them) if chapter 2 is 
adopted. 
Chapter 5 of the Family Dissolution Principles effects a 
substantial revision of the basic principles of post-divorce alimony or 
spousal support, which the ALI relabels “compensatory payments.” 
The proposed provisions embody a radical change of alimony 
principles, based in large part on the gender-discriminatory principle 
that the spouse who earns the most generally should have a post-
divorce duty to share income with the other spouse even if the other 
spouse is self-supporting.148 Economic loss is the governing 
consideration, but causal connection between marriage and loss is 
not required.149 Equalization of post-divorce income solely for the 
sake of gender-income equalization is as unjust as it is popular with 
radical feminists.150 In determining compensatory payments, the 
grounds or reasons for the failure and breakup of the marriage 
generally are irrelevant; “fault” is not a valid consideration with 
regard to compensatory payments (except behavior, such as spouse 
abuse or child abuse, generally—and erroneously—attributed 
predominantly to males).151 
The provisions of chapter 7 on antenuptial contracts would 
reverse the trend of the past four decades of generally respecting 
party autonomy to structure the financial dimensions of spousal (and 
imitative) relationships. Chapter 7 is generally hostile to enforcement 
of premarital (and pre-nonmarital) agreements. For instance, chapter 
7 requires agreement thirty days prior to marriage, and even if all of 
the strict requirements are met, the burden of proof is on the party 
seeking to enforce the contract to establish that it was not invalid.152 
 
She won a temporary order of visitation. 
 148. There is conceptual harmony between the unilateralism of chapter 6 and of chapter 
5. Chapter 6 effectively provides for the creation of the economic relationship of domestic 
partnership any time either cohabiting party wants to create it. Chapter 5 effectively continues 
the economic relationship (spousal support) after the dissolution of a marital relationship as 
long as the economic “losing” party wants it. 
 149. See generally PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, Part I), supra note 7, § 5.02(1) & 
(2) & cmts. a, e; id. Reporter’s Notes, at 265, 269–71. 
 150. Id. See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475 n. 
40 (1999); Ellman, supra note 99; Michelle Murphy, Alimony as an Equalizing Force in 
Divorce, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313 (2000). 
 151. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, Part I), supra note 7, § 5.02(2) & cmt. c. 
 152. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 7.05. 
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Other provisions also provide that if a child is born after the party 
signed the antenuptial contract or if the relationship lasts a certain 
number of years before breakup, the court has the discretion to 
decline to enforce the antenuptial contract on vague and subjective 
“substantial injustice” grounds.153  
The deconstruction of marriage is promoted in chapter 7. For 
example, section 7.12 forbids enforcement of “covenant marriage” 
agreements and other reinforced marriage commitments.154 Likewise, 
Professor Ellman’s views against any principles of moral 
responsibility in dissolution law are manifest in this chapter.155 
Provisions in agreements that require consideration of marital 
misconduct in awarding property or alimony are unenforceable.156 
Thus, the attempt to deconstruct marriage and families is pervasive 
throughout the ALI Principles. 
Apart from ideologically driven flaws in the Principles there are a 
number of gaps in the coverage of the project. For example, the 
Family Dissolution Principles fail to discuss, much less recommend, 
any procedural reforms for dissolution proceedings that might 
ameliorate some of the trauma associated with such proceedings and 
the breakup of families. Mediation, other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution, waiting periods, counseling, and other practical methods 
of providing protection against damaging, hasty, ill-considered 
action, and against hostile and abusive tactics are not generally 
considered or proposed in the Family Dissolution Principles. The 
absence of provisions dealing with jurisdiction for dissolution 
(divorce) and related proceedings is a serious disappointment. 
Jurisdictional issues relating to divorce proceedings have not been 
seriously considered in fifty years,157 yet much has changed in other 
branches of the law of jurisdiction (including due process principles) 
during that time. Likewise, as Ralph Whitten points out in his 
paper,158 there are significant issues relating to conflicts of laws raised 
 
 153. Id. § 7.07. 
 154. “A term in an agreement is not enforceable if it (1) limits . . . the grounds for 
divorce . . . .” Id. § 7.12. Likewise, penalties for filing for dissolution are unenforceable. Id. § 
7.12(3). 
 155. See supra notes 99 & 142. 
 156. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 7.12(2). 
 157. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Williams v. North Carolina (II), 
325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
 158. Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some Conflict-of-
Laws Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 1235.  
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by the Principles, and family law would have been well served by a 
systematic consideration of the choice of law and judgment 
recognition dimensions of dissolution, custody, support, and marital 
property division decrees. Regrettably, those topics were simply 
ignored in the ALI Family Dissolution Principles. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The major flaw in the Family Dissolution Principles in general, 
and chapter 6 in particular, is that it deconstructs family relations and 
tries to “level” marriage, parenting, and “alternative” relationships 
by greatly expanding the kinds of relationships that are given the 
same preferred, privileged legal status and benefits as “family” 
relations. Some aspects of that theme pervade nearly all of the 
chapters of the Family Dissolution Principles, but it is in chapter 6 
that this theme is expressed most clearly and perhaps most 
dangerously. There, a new concubinage status called “domestic 
partnership” is created and defined overbroadly, ridiculously easy 
establishment of the new status is provided for, and based upon that 
status the same economic rights and obligations accorded married 
persons are extended to nonmarital cohabitants upon dissolution. 
Due to ambiguous yet strategic drafting, a host of practical problems 
can be expected if chapter 6 becomes law. A few of the provisions 
reflect good intentions, if not good ideas, but they are so 
intellectualized and so ambiguous that they are practically incapable 
of nonarbitrary application. Rather than settling the law, chapter 6 
and significant other parts of the Family Dissolution Principles are 
likely to unsettle the law and generate increased litigation. 
The potentially profound social effects of conferring legal 
equivalence upon alternative relationships has not been wisely 
considered by the ALI Principles. Chapter 6 relies on what the ALI 
Reporters perceive to be recent social changes to justify a significant 
revision of the basic institution of marriage and family life.159 It is far 
from clear, however, that the drafters have not mistaken a mere 
temporary lifestyle fad for a significant social change, confusing a 
flashy but transitory generational blip in a few demographic cohorts 
for real lasting social change. Nothing could be more common; every 
generation sees its time as a time of pivotal social change and 
 
 159. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a. 
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perceives its fads as constituting great political progress and social 
reformation. But after a few brief decades, after a few natural 
calamities, a few wars, a few years of economic troubles, the fads fade 
and the vaunted new lifestyles wilt and largely disappear. In the 
meantime, however, large numbers of the affected generation will 
suffer from the tragic (and unnecessary) deprivation and 
impoverishment of their family life wrought by social engineers 
whose devaluation of marriage and marriage-based families facilitated 
and encouraged couples and families to discard the only solid 
foundation for secure family relations in order to pursue shabby 
counterfeit “functional equivalents” like domestic partnership. 
The ALI Principles achieve plausible coherence only by 
dismissing the powerful bonds of marriage and parenthood as 
subjective, artificial social constructs. It is based firmly on the 
principle of moral relativism that equates homosexual partners and 
nonmarital cohabitation with marriage, that deems a lesbian’s 
friendship with the child of another woman as the equivalent of 
maternal love, that equates a roommate’s desire for influence over a 
child or children with parental responsibility. It insists that marital 
love between husband and wife is no different from any intimate 
relationship that results from cohabitation by consenting adults. 
Thus, significant portions of the Family Dissolution Principles are 
mere ideology masquerading as policy—liberal dogma passed off as 
legal principle. Chapter 6 virtually ignores the entire body of social 
science research about the characteristics of nonmarital cohabitation 
as well as the profound lessons about those human relationships 
taught by history, tradition, and human experience that might 
inform a responsible law reform initiative. Rather, it reflects a terribly 
impoverished view of marriage and marriage-based family life that 
borders on cynicism and despair. 
The Family Dissolution Principles in general, and chapter 6 in 
particular, represent a squandered opportunity for the ALI. The time 
is ripe for dissolution law reform. There have been no comprehensive 
proposals for reform of dissolution law in America since the UMDA 
was proposed in 1970. The UMDA was a pre-no-fault divorce 
reform and its major contribution to family law was to endorse and 
show how to implement no-fault divorce. Since the UMDA was 
proposed, a no-fault divorce revolution has swept the country, and 
the states have had a quarter-century of experience with no-fault 
divorce. A generation has grown up since the no-fault divorce 
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revolution and the UMDA. The world has changed much since then, 
and much more is known today about divorce consequences (for 
children and adults) and processes than was known then. The dreams 
of sexual liberation and freedom from family commitments that 
seemed so attractive to the free-spirit generation of the 1960s and 
1970s seem much less glamorous to the current generation who 
were the children of or grew up in the era of no-fault divorce. A 
number of unexpected and undesirable consequences of the no-fault 
divorce reforms of the 1970s have been identified, and the public 
dissatisfaction with the regime of unilateral no-fault divorce and with 
adversary custody and visitation litigation is growing. Thus, the time 
is right for a comprehensive review of and proposal for reform of 
dissolution law in the United States, but the ALI has fumbled the 
opportunity by seeking to radically deconstruct the family and 
equalize alternative relations. So the opportunity to responsibly 
guide the reform of family dissolution law in America remains, and 
some other organizations and individuals may now step forward, 
profiting from the mistakes of the ALI, to offer more practical, 
prudent, reasonable, responsible, and well-tailored law reform 
proposals. 
 
